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Abstract: My topic in this paper will be Hume’s claim that we have no idea of a 
vacuum. I offer a novel interpretation of Hume’s account of our ideas of exten-
sion that makes it clear why those ideas cannot include any ideas of vacuums, 
and I distinguish my interpretation from prominent readings offered by other 
Hume scholars. An upshot of Hume’s account, I will argue, is his commitment 
to a remarkable and distinctly Humean view I call “perceptual relationism.” 
Perceptual relationism is a fundamental characteristic of Hume’s “universe 
of the imagination,” and a manifestation of just how “loose and separate” 
the constituents of that inner universe are. Once we understand perceptual 
relationism and its entailments, we are in a better position to understand the 
rest of Hume’s sometimes puzzling remarks on space and the vacuum.
Hume’s discussion of our ideas of space and time in Book 1, part 2 of the Treatise 
of Human Nature1 has occasioned both perplexity and asperity in many of his in-
terpreters. Several of these interpreters have expressed confusion about the proper 
interpretation of Hume’s views, along with puzzlement about his further philo-
sophical purposes in developing those views. And the interpretive commentary 
includes recurrent expressions of skepticism about both the logical coherence and 
the ultimate philosophical value of Hume’s position.2
Yet there is no doubt that in advancing positions on infinite divisibility and 
the composition of extension, on the foundations of geometry, and on putative 
ideas of the vacuum or the plenum, Hume was offering contributions to important 
foundational topics in mathematics and natural philosophy, topics that were vigor-
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ously debated in his own time. And we know Hume had expressed high hopes that 
his own science of human nature would yield improvements in these sciences.3
My topic in this paper will be Hume’s claim that we have no idea of a vacuum, 
a claim whose defense is the main subject of Treatise 1.2.5. My central aim is to 
make it clear both why and in what sense, for Hume, our ideas cannot include any 
ideas of vacuums. Previous interpretations of Hume’s discussion have often been 
hampered, I believe, by a failure to draw clear conceptual distinctions between 
the one-place properties of extension and length, on the one hand, and two-place 
distance relations on the other. Due to the failure to attend to these crucial distinc-
tions, important related distinctions among different senses of “vacuum,” “void,” 
and “plenum” have sometimes been overlooked. So, I will spend a good deal of 
time clarifying these distinctions in section two of the article, before moving on 
to the textual interpretation proper in sections three and four. Part one of the 
paper will prepare the ground by setting out the general principles of Hume’s 
system regarding space.
An upshot of Hume’s account, I will argue, is his commitment to a remarkable 
and distinctly Humean view I call “perceptual relationism.” Perceptual relationism 
is a fundamental characteristic of Hume’s “universe of the imagination,” and a 
manifestation of just how “loose and separate” the constituents of that inner uni-
verse are. Once we understand perceptual relationism, along with the important 
distinction between extensions and distances, we will then be in a better position 
to understand the rest of Hume’s sometimes puzzling doctrines on space and the 
vacuum. Perceptual relationism is a view about what kinds of ideas we can have, 
and thus about what kinds of material worlds are conceivable. Following my pre-
sentation and explanation of perceptual relationism in section three, I will then 
move on in the last section of the paper to defend an interpretation of how Hume’s 
thinking on how these conceivability questions bears on his further discussion in 
Treatise 1.2.5 of several early modern foundational questions in natural philosophy, 
questions that are about what kinds of spatial worlds are and are not possible, and 
also about what kinds of spatial worlds might or might not be actual.
1. Hume’s General Position on Space and Time
Hume’s system concerning space and time contains two parts. The first part, which 
is developed in Treatise 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, and defended against objections in Treatise 
1.2.4, is the denial of infinite divisibility. The denial encompasses both our ideas 
of extension and extension itself:
The capacity of the mind is not infinite; consequently, no idea of exten-
sion or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, 
but of a finite number, and these simple and indivisible: It is therefore 
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possible for space and time to exist conformable to this idea: And if it be 
possible, it is certain they actually do exist conformable to it; since their 
infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory. (T 1.2.4.1; 
SBN 40)
The second part of Hume’s system is an account of the intrinsic nature of our 
ideas of space and time, and it includes his assertion that a vacuum is inconceivable:
The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, 
become at last indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being nothing in 
themselves, are inconceivable when not filled with something real and 
existent. The ideas of space and time are therefore no separate or distinct 
ideas, but merely those of the manner or order, in which objects exist: Or 
in other words, it is impossible to conceive either a vacuum and exten-
sion without matter, or a time, when there was no succession or change 
in any real existence. (T 1.2.4.2; SBN 40–41)
Hume restates the second part of the system at the head of Treatise 1.2.5: “If the 
second part of my system be true, that the idea of space or extension is nothing 
but the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order; it follows, 
that we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or 
tangible” (T 1.2.5.1; SBN 54). Note that in these passages Hume has identified the 
concept of a vacuum with the concept of extension without matter, or a space where 
there is nothing visible or tangible. It will be very important to keep these specified 
conceptions of a vacuum in mind as we proceed, since there are other possible ways 
of understanding the term “vacuum,” and some of those ways of understanding 
the term correspond to situations whose conceivability Hume does not deny.
Before discussing Hume’s repudiation of ideas of a vacuum, a few interpretive 
decisions need to be taken. Firstly, one possible source of confusion in Hume’s 
discussion stems from his frequent habit of speaking of the idea of space and time. 
This kind of talk can be misleading in several ways. For one thing, even when 
Hume is giving an account of only our abstract or general ideas of space and time, 
there is clearly more than one such idea to be considered. Humean abstract ideas 
are particular ideas “annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more general 
signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are 
similar to them” (T 1.1.7.1; SBN 18). Different people thus possess different abstract 
ideas of the same thing, and whether an idea is abstract or not for some person 
depends not on its intrinsic nature, but on how that idea functions within that 
thinker’s entire system of associated ideas. And even a single thinker might employ 
different abstract ideas at different times for the same general feature of the world.
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Now, Hume is clearly attempting to give, at least, an account of all abstract or 
general ideas of space and time. But I will hold that Hume is not just giving an ac-
count of our general ideas of space and time, but means to assert a claim about all 
our particular ideas of space and time as well. Every time one thinks of a spatially 
extended thing, one employs an idea of extension; and the nature of all such 
ideas is Hume’s topic in laying out his two-part system concerning ideas of space.4
A second interpretive issue concerns how we should understand the manner 
or order in which the components of spatial objects or perceptions are disposed. 
I believe it is fundamental to Hume’s approach that the manner in which these 
components are disposed is not something separable from the elementary percep-
tual objects or components themselves. Following Lorne Falkenstein and others,5 
I believe that it is Hume’s view that only a distinction of reason can be made be-
tween the objects which are spatially disposed, on the one hand, and the spatial 
disposition of those objects on the other hand.6
A closely related issue concerns the relationship between the ways in which 
the components of spatial perceptions are disposed and the ways in which the 
components of extended bodies are disposed. In Treatise 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, for ex-
ample, Hume seeks to establish that all of our ideas of space and time are composed 
of indivisible perceptual minima. He then mounts a striking and controversial 
argument to the effect that space and time themselves must exist in conformity 
to those ideas. Are our perceptions of extended things, then, extended in the very 
same sense in which the spatially disposed objects they represent are extended? 
Are the perceptual minima that compose our perceptions of extension disposed 
or arranged in the same kinds of manners in which the spatially disposed objects 
they represent are disposed or arranged? I will assume the answer to both of these 
questions is “yes.” As a result, we can say Hume is committed to the spatiality of 
spatial perception.
Finally, I believe it is important to notice that the approach Hume takes in 
Treatise 1.2 is straightforwardly representationalist in at least the following sense: 
Hume appears to presuppose throughout his discussion in this part of the Treatise 
that our impressions of visible objects are caused by external objects that emit 
or reflect light, and which in turn affect the organs of sensation and the brain to 
produce impressions.7 Hume also argues that the external realities of space and 
time themselves must be similar in certain ways to the impressions they cause, and 
that we are also bound—under risk of confusion and contradiction—to conceive 
of these external realities in ways that are not “specifically different” from the 
perceptions we employ to think about them.8
The representationalism in Treatise 1.2 seems to stand in some tension with 
the powerful “sceptical malady” described and exhibited in Treatise 1.4. It appears 
to me that in the earlier Treatise 1.2 passage that is our present concern, Hume 
wishes to leave the deeper skeptical complications of part four in abeyance, so he 
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can address other issues about space, time, and the representation of space and 
time by sensation and thought in a manner relevant to the foundational debates 
of his time, without the additional complication of the powerful skeptical argu-
ments that emerge later in the Treatise.
2. A Relationist Framework for Interpreting Hume’s Views
Hume’s discussion of the ancient dispute concerning a vacuum and a plenum, 
and his account of our putative ideas of these things, is intended to make a con-
tribution to an ongoing debate which was very much alive, and even acute, in 
Hume’s time. The vacuum was an important topic in the Leibniz-Clarke debate, 
and the status of the vacuum was a key point of contention between the defend-
ers of the older Cartesian physics and their rising Newtonian rivals.9 It might be 
thought that since it is Hume’s view that we can have no idea of a vacuum, then 
he must be committed to the view that every idea of extension we have is an idea 
of a plenum. If we have no ideas that are ideas of empty space, then must not all 
of our spatial ideas be ideas of a space that is “full”? But this question is suscep-
tible to ambiguity, an ambiguity Hume discusses directly in connection with 
the “easily-explained paradox” he introduces near the end of Treatise 1.2.5. We 
will return to that paradox later, but to help interpret Hume’s claims in the light 
of their philosophical context, it will be useful to develop a general conceptual 
framework within which we can represent some of the main doctrinal alternatives, 
and along the way introduce some convenient terminology for marking out and 
distinguishing those alternatives.
We can begin by taking for granted intuitive notions of distance, degrees of 
distance, and contiguity. Two minima, then, whether bodily or perceptual, will 
be said to be distant from one another other just in case they are not contiguous. 
And more broadly, two complex arrangements of minima A and B will be said to 
be distant from one another if and only if there are no two distinct and contiguous 
minima C and D such that C is contained in A and D is contained in B. We will 
assume that whenever we have two pairs of minima, where the elements of the 
first pair are distant from each other and where the elements of the second pair 
are likewise distant from each other, we can properly speak of the elements of the 
first pair as being either more distant, less distant or equally distant in comparison 
with the elements of the second pair.
I will follow Hume in using “body” and “matter” interchangeably, as I believe 
he does. Note also that, for Hume, some aggregates of spatial minima form “ex-
tensions.” Extensions are aggregates of mutually co-existent spatial minima that 
form unbroken stretches by virtue of the fact that their parts are connected along 
a single path by the relation of contiguity.10 It is an important part of Hume’s con-
ception of extension that these continua are never infinitely divisible, and always 
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contain only finitely many minima. Some parts of an extension may themselves 
be extended, but not all of them will be extended. That is because the minima 
themselves count as parts of extension,11 and Hume is explicit in holding that these 
minima are not themselves extended.12 So when we need to use a term that is indif-
ferent between spatial minima and the extensions composed of spatial minima, 
we will simply use “parts of extension” or “components of extension.” Whenever 
we have an aggregate of coexistent parts of extension spatially disposed in some 
matter, we will say that we have a spatial system. Note that any spatial system in 
which the minima are entirely scattered—that is, in which no two of the minima 
are contiguous—will be a spatial system none of whose parts are extensions.
We will see that Hume’s account of extension and of ideas of extension is best 
understood as a variety of relationism. Relationism in the philosophy of space, 
time, and motion has been developed along a number of different dimensions, for 
a variety of philosophical purposes, and with varying degrees of complexity and 
formal sophistication.13 But for our limited exegetical purposes here, relationism 
can be understood as consisting in two parts: the first part is the view that the 
holding of distance relations between separated material bodies does not depend 
on whether or not those bodies occupy, or are embedded in, some kind of non-
material container space or background space. The second part is the view that 
the holding of distance relations between separated material bodies does not 
depend on whether or not something extended lies between the bodies. We will 
refer to the first of these two relationist views as the doctrine of the independence of 
matter, and will refer to the second of the two as the doctrine of the independence 
of distance. Because a proper grasp of Hume’s arguments concerning the vacuum 
depends on having a good intuitive understanding of relationist conceptions of 
spatial properties and relations, it will be good to dwell on these two doctrines just 
a bit, beginning with the second part, the independence of distance, since that is 
the part most likely to lead to confusion.
From our earliest school training in Euclidean geometry, we become accus-
tomed to thinking of all pairs of spatial points A and B as determining a Euclidean 
line, one segment of which lies entirely between A and B, and has A and B as its end-
points. That connecting line segment has a length, as do all of the other bounded 
continuous curves that have A and B as their endpoints, and these segments and 
curves contain other spatial points alike in kind to A and B. In a Euclidean world, 
the length of those other curves is never less than the length of the line segment, 
and the only connecting curve with a length exactly equal to that of the con-
necting line segment is the curve that consists of that line segment itself. We also 
think of A and B as being distant from each other to some degree, and regard the 
quantity of the distance from A to B as being equal in some way to the length of the 
connecting line segment. We might even think of the length of the line segment 
as grounding or constituting the distance between A and B. We thus fall easily into 
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positing an intimate relationship between length, which is a one-place property 
of a continuous curve, and distance, which is a two-place relation between points.
The relationist doctrine of the independence of distance severs this intuitive 
relationship between length and distance. If the doctrine of the independence 
of distance holds, then the fact that A is two meters from B, for example, does 
not entail that A and B are also the endpoints of some continuous, extended line 
segment or curve that is two meters long. The distance relation can hold even if 
there is nothing extended whatsoever between A and B. Note that the doctrine 
of the independence of distance is intended to apply to extensions of any type. 
It is not just the claim that two bodies A and B can lie at some distance from one 
another even if there is no extended body lying between them. It is also intended 
to imply that A and B can lie at some distance from one another even if there is 
no continuous expanse of empty space lying between them.14
Let’s turn now to the first of the two relationist views that I described: the 
doctrine of the independence of matter. Instruction in elementary mechanics usually 
proceeds by starting with the description of a space with a postulated geometric 
structure, and then moves on to the kinematical description of the motions of 
massive bodies or field modifications through that space, and the working out 
of the consequences of dynamical laws governing those motions.15 The space is 
thus viewed intuitively as a kind of background against which, or within which, 
the motions of various material bodies or other physical quantities take place. But 
according to the doctrine of the independence of matter, we need not take the el-
ementary picture literally, despite whatever value it might possess as a convenient 
framework of laying out the science of dynamics. The relationist defender of the 
independence of matter will typically hold that only the bodies themselves are 
physically real. They will argue that while material bodies can stand in various 
distance relations among themselves, and move with respect to one another, there 
need not also exist some extra, non-material spatial stuff that the bodies occupy, 
penetrate or modify in order for those distances to obtain or motions to occur.16
Given a conception of spatial arrangement and distance founded on the twin 
theses of the independence of distance and the independence of matter, it is nev-
ertheless possible to have “voids” of a certain kind, so long as these are understood 
in purely relational terms as systems of objects standing some distance from one 
another other without anything at all lying between them, not even empty im-
material space. I believe Hume makes implicit reference to this kind of void when 
he asks us to consider “two bodies containing no void within their circumference” 
at Treatise 1.2.4.5. Consider, for example, the difference between a solid red, plane 
circular patch of one meter radius, on the one hand, and on the other hand an 
annulus (that is, a ring-shaped region) with an inner radius of 99 centimeters and 
an outer radius of one meter, and whose one-centimeter outer band is likewise 
solid red. If we consider some arbitrary red-colored minimum on the inner edge 
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of the band, we can take it that there will be some other red-colored minimum 
directly opposite that first minimum, and lying 198 centimeters from the first 
minimum.17 I believe Hume wants to affirm the conceivability of a spatial system 
that consists entirely of that annular band, where the colored material points lying 
in the inner edge of the band can stand in distance relations to one another in 
the way I just described, but where there is absolutely nothing lying between such 
pairs of points, not even empty space. Such a red annulus coexisting with no other 
nearby spatial minima, would be an example of a body that does contain a “void 
within its circumference,” even though that circumference contains no vacuum 
within its circumference; that is, even though there is no extension lying within 
its circumference that is unoccupied by matter. The solid red circular disk, on the 
other hand, in addition to containing no vacuum within its circumference, also 
contains no void within its circumference.
The discussion of the vacuum, and of its conceivability or inconceivability, 
goes hand in hand with the discussion of the concept of a plenum. Intuitively, a 
plenum is a region of space that is filled. But if we think in terms of the relational 
picture of space that accords with the independence of matter and the indepen-
dence of distance, we have to recognize different manners in which space can be 
filled. On the one hand, any thinker who denies the existence of empty space must 
believe in a plenum in a certain trivial sense, since all spatially disposed components 
of extension are then either regions of space filled by actually existing bodies or 
are actually existing bodies themselves. There will be no empty immaterial spatial 
regions, or even points, that are not filled with matter. However, such a thinker 
might at the same time believe that the universe of extension and its parts con-
tains vast relational voids of the kind just described in the previous paragraph. 
And there is clearly some more robust sense of “plenum” in which belief in the 
existence of these kinds of voids runs contrary to traditional views according to 
which the world is a plenum, since a world containing purely relational “gaps” 
of this kind between bodies could be further filled up with matter. Let us define 
a material plenum as any spatial system that contains some matter but does not 
contain any unoccupied space, that is, a spatial system in which there is either 
no space distinct from matter at all, or in which there is some space distinct from 
matter, but in which that space is all occupied by matter. And let us say that a 
relational material void is a spatial system that contains at least one pair of bodies 
that are non-contiguous, but do not have any other component of extension lying 
between them. Using these concepts, we can draw a distinction between a spatial 
system that is a material plenum containing no relational material voids and a spatial 
system that is a material plenum containing a relational material void. Every material 
plenum is either one of the first kind or of the second kind, but never both. Going 
forward, we will sometimes just use the term “plenum” for “material plenum” and 
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“relational void” for “relational material void,” since there are no other relevant 
kinds to consider in the context of Hume’s discussion.
Finally, let us say that a vacuum is any spatial system that consists entirely of 
unoccupied space, and in which that unoccupied space constitutes an extension. 
As Hume says, a vacuum is “extension without matter.” A vacuum, should one ex-
ist, might exist entirely on its own, or as part of a larger spatial system. Here, then, 
are three key doctrines that I believe Hume wishes to establish in Treatise 1.2.5:
1. We can form no idea of a spatial system containing a vacuum.
2. We can form an idea of a plenum containing relational voids.
3. We can form an idea of a plenum containing no relational voids.
These three doctrines comprise three claims about the kinds of spatial world that 
are, by Hume’s lights, conceivable. In the next section I will present Hume’s ar-
guments in favor of these claims. Following my discussion of Hume’s defense of 
these doctrines, I will then move on in the last section of the paper to defend an 
interpretation of the role Hume’s perceptual relationism plays in his further discus-
sion of important foundational questions in the natural philosophy of his time.
3. The Luminous Bodies Thought Experiment
The core of Hume’s denial of the existence of ideas of a vacuum is contained in his 
evaluation of an intriguing thought experiment concerning a hypothetical situ-
ation in which “amidst an entire darkness, there are luminous bodies presented 
to us, whose light discovers only these bodies themselves, without giving us any 
impression of the surrounding objects” (T 1.2.5.8; SBN 56). In order to understand 
the point Hume wishes to make in considering the luminous bodies thought ex-
periment, we need to understand what Hume means by “darkness.” Hume begins 
his discussion this way:
’Tis evident the idea of darkness is no positive idea, but merely the nega-
tion of light, or more properly speaking, of coloured and visible objects. 
A man, who enjoys his sight, receives no other perception from turning 
his eyes on every side, when entirely depriv’d of light, than what is com-
mon to him with one born blind; and ‘tis certain such-a-one has no idea 
either of light or darkness. The consequence of this is, that it is not from 
the mere removal of visible objects we receive the impression of extension 
without matter; and that the idea of utter darkness can never be the same 
with that of vacuum. (T 1.2.5.5; SBN 56–57)
Hume Studies
10 Dan Kervick
Hume appears to presuppose in this passage that the condition of congenital 
blindness involves the complete absence of visual impressions—and hence, by 
the copy principle, visual ideas—of any kind, since such impressions would have 
to present either darkness or some degree of light, and the person born blind has 
no perception of either light or darkness. The idea of darkness, on the other hand, 
which sighted persons do possess, consists in the negation of light. Hume does not 
tell us much about the nature of ideas of that are not “positive ideas”; however, it is 
clear that he believes the possession of an idea of the absence or negation of light 
requires possession of the idea of light, and that the idea of light is properly speak-
ing the idea of colored or visible objects. The person born blind, who has never 
had any visual experience of light, thus has no ideas of either light or darkness.
Now consider the sighted person in some visual setting that is entirely deprived 
of light. This person certainly does have ideas of colored and visible objects, ideas 
derived from earlier visible impressions. However, were that sighted person to be 
in a situation entirely deprived of light, Hume has just said, that person’s present 
visual experiences would be identical to the visual experiences of blind people. In 
other words, that light-deprived, but sighted, person would have no visual impres-
sions whatsoever. Thus, while the sighted person possesses an idea of darkness, that 
idea is derived in some way from earlier experiences of light, and not from some 
present visual impression of darkness representing the light-deprived situation in 
which the person finds herself, since there is no such thing as a visual impression 
of darkness alone. We can sum this up by saying that one cannot acquire the idea 
of darkness simply by being in the dark.
But Hume has argued that our visual ideas of extension are always ideas of 
colored points arranged in a certain manner.18 Hume concludes, then, that if there 
are ideas of extension without matter, they cannot be derived from impressions of 
darkness and cannot be identical with the idea of utter darkness. Since the idea of 
utter darkness is an idea of the absence of colored and visible objects, the idea of 
utter darkness is an idea of the complete absence of extension, not the idea of an 
existing but materially evacuated extension.
Hume then moves to consider another possibility, that darkness and the re-
moval of visible things can convey the idea of extension without matter, “when 
mixed with something visible and tangible.” The problem in even entertaining 
this possibility, however, is that we do not in the ordinary course of life experience 
genuine darkness, much less colored things “in the midst of” genuine darkness.19 
When we have impressions of foreground objects with no visible objects lying 
between them, we typically perceive those objects against a colored background, so 
the intervening perceptual space does not appear devoid of colored, visible objects, 
but instead appears to be filled by the color of the background. Hume says that it 
is “commonly allowed by philosophers” that all bodies visually appear to us “as 
if painted on a plain surface,” and that we make our judgments about the differ-
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ent degrees of remoteness of the foreground and background objects by applying 
reason to these “plain surface” representations: “When I hold up my hand before 
me, and spread my fingers, they are separated as perfectly by the blue colour of 
the firmament, as they could be by any visible object, which I could place betwixt 
them” (T 1.2.5.8; SBN 57). The luminous bodies thought experiment Hume wishes 
us to consider, by contrast, invokes luminous bodies presented to us “amidst an 
entire darkness,” not against a colored background.
Another difficulty in even entertaining the possibility of the sort of situation 
Hume wishes us to consider attaches to the fact that even in a situation in which 
two small luminous bodies are presented to us in an environment otherwise devoid 
entirely of other light-emitting bodies, those luminous bodies typically cast some 
light on the objects in their vicinity. So, Hume underlines the unusual and hypo-
thetical nature of his thought experiment by stipulating it to be one in which the 
light from those bodies “discovers only these bodies themselves, without giving 
us any impression of the surrounding objects” (T 1.2.5.8; SBN 57).
Before moving on to consider the lessons Hume wishes to draw from the con-
sideration of this thought experiment, it is worth pausing to eliminate a possible 
misinterpretation of Hume’s example. It might seem plausible to hold that the 
visual perception of colored, luminous bodies amidst darkness always involves the 
positioning of those objects against either a black or other darkly colored back-
ground. After all, the painter or draughtsman who would attempt to draw such a 
scene would probably select a colored medium at the dark end of the value scale 
to represent the negative space in which objects are absent. Or that artist might 
choose a very darkly colored paper or prepared canvass to represent the darkness. 
As in the visual arts, so in visual perception, one might think. Hume suggests such 
an analogy himself between the visual perception of light amidst darkness and the 
painter’s representation of darkness with his comment about the appearance of 
objects, “as if painted on a plain surface.” And John Locke had argued in his Essay 
concerning Human Understanding that some negative realities were represented by 
positive ideas, and that we can visually represent the absence of light and color 
via a positive idea of the color of blackness.20
Yet, however plausible and historically venerable this analogy might appear, 
it seems quite clear that it does not represent Hume’s understanding of the visual 
experience involved in his thought experiment. Hume insists that the situation 
he is asking us to consider is one which is supposed to be quite close to the experi-
ence of the person born blind. He asks us to consider the sudden appearance of 
the luminous bodies as succeeding a condition of complete darkness, and stresses 
the extremely minimal change from the one situation to the other:
We may observe, that when two bodies present themselves, where there 
was formerly an entire darkness, the only change, that is discoverable, is 
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in the appearance of these two objects, and that all the rest continues to 
be as before, a perfect negation of light, and of every coloured or visible 
object. (T 1.2.5.10; SBN 58)
He reiterates this point twice, just to make sure we do not miss it:
The sole difference betwixt an absolute darkness and the appearance of 
two or more visible luminous objects consists, as I said, in the objects 
themselves, and in the manner they affect our senses. (T 1.2.5.11; SBN 57)
These bodies are perceived as possessing color, and as disposed in such a 
manner as to be separated by some distance or other. The rest is a perfect 
negation of light. (T 1.2.5.12; SBN 57–58)
And Hume has already made it clear that he understands the condition of total 
darkness for the sighted person to be visually equivalent to the condition of a 
person born blind, and that he takes the person born blind to have no experience 
of color whatsoever. Since the sole change that accompanies the introduction 
of two luminous bodies into this otherwise dark situation is supposed to lie in 
the objects themselves, along with their colors and manner or arrangement or 
disposition, the darkness is not to be considered as visually represented by some 
color, not even the color black.21
So, what would we perceive in the hypothetical situation described by the 
thought experiment? In such a situation, Hume says, we could perceive whether 
the objects are conjoined or separate, that is, whether they are related by conti-
guity or distance, two of the relations Hume has described as falling among the 
species of relation involving space and time. If we perceive them as separate, we 
can perceive the degree to which they are separate. And if the bodies are in mo-
tion, we can perceive the corresponding increase or diminution of the relation of 
distance between them (T 1.2.5.10; SBN 57).
But the distance we perceive in the illuminated bodies thought experiment 
is, as Hume describes it, “invisible and intangible.” In ordinary cases, by contrast, 
when we perceive two bodies to be spatially distant or separated to any degree, 
we perceive them to be separated by a “visible or tangible” distance. That is, we 
ordinary perceive distant bodies to be separated by an extended expanse of color, 
even if only the color of a background such as the blue color of the firmament. 
But visually perceiving the invisible distance does not depend on perceiving the 
bodies as separated by any visible, colored bodies or colored expanse; it does not 
require the perception of some separate expanse of color that we can distinguish 
from the bodies themselves.22 And since the visual perception of extension does 
involve the perception of colored points disposed in some particular manner, this 
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means that the visual perception of the invisible distance between two bodies does 
not require the perception of extension without matter:
Now since this distance causes no perception different from what a blind 
man receives from his eyes, or what is conveyed to us in the darkest night, 
it must partake of the same properties: And as blindness and darkness 
afford us no ideas of extension, it is impossible that the dark and undis-
tinguishable distance betwixt two bodies can ever produce that idea. (T 
1.2.5.11; SBN 58)
It is a consequence of this understanding of the perception of distance that 
Hume is committed to a view that I will call perceptual relationism. Recalling our 
earlier discussion of manners of disposition and the spatiality of visual percep-
tion, let us say that when a person experiences some complex visual perception 
which presents any number of visual minima disposed at various distances from 
one another, then perceptual distance relations hold among those visual minima. 
We can then express perceptual relationism as follows:
Perceptual Relationism: The holding of perceptual distance relations among 
any two coexistent perceptual minima A and B that are both part of some 
complex perception does not depend on whether or not there are any other 
perceptual minima coexistent with A and B, and that are perceived as either 
disposed between A and B, or disposed in any other manner whatsoever with 
respect to A and B.
On Hume’s view, as a consequence of perceptual relationism, it is possible to 
have visual perceptions consisting entirely of some very small number of minimal 
visual elements, even as few as two, disposed at some perceptual distance from 
one another. Those minimal perceptions need not be embedded in any extended 
perceptual ground or field, or unifying perceptual cement. Just as, for the spatial 
relationist, material bodies can stand in distance relations even if there is no 
background container space in which those bodies are embedded, so for Hume 
the components of visual perception can be disposed at some visual distance one 
from another, even if those components are not embedded in some background 
“inner space” that separates them.23
Now it follows that if we can have no visual idea of empty space, of extension 
without matter, then every visual idea we possess must be an idea of a material 
plenum of some kind. Insofar as we have perceptions of extension and components 
of extension of any kind, we perceive all such components as “filled” by color or 
body. But note that Hume does not say that we can only perceive and conceive 
the world as a plenum containing no relational material voids. The world need not 
appear as spatially saturated or “full.” The luminous bodies thought experiment 
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contemplates a situation in which we perceive a material plenum containing a 
relational void, not a plenum containing no relational voids. Hume only insists 
that when we do have perceptions of such situations, we must not understand 
these perceptions as representing a situation in which the luminous bodies are 
separated by some kind of matter-free, color-free, invisible extension—that is, as 
empty space. We are, therefore, not conceiving a vacuum when we form an idea 
of two luminous bodies amidst a total darkness.
By closely examining Hume’s luminous bodies thought experiment, we have 
brought out a fundamental feature of Hume’s understanding of visual experience 
and of our ideas of extension. With this understanding in hand, we are now in a 
position to clarify several of the other puzzling passages in the Treatise that occur 
in the context of Hume’s discussion of the second part of his system concerning 
space and time. In the next and final section of this paper, I will develop some of 
the consequences of perceptual relationism for the interpretation of those passages.
4. The Role of Perceptual Relationism in Hume’s System
In this final section of my paper, I will discuss the bearing of Hume’s perceptual 
relationism on the more comprehensive account of extension, distance, and our 
ideas of extension and distance, that Hume develops in defending the second part 
of his system of space and time in Treatise 1.2.5. First, we will examine Hume’s ac-
count of how we should respond to the classic problem of the evacuated chamber. 
We will then consider the question of whether Hume goes beyond the claim that 
a vacuum is inconceivable to the more robust modal claim that a vacuum is impos-
sible. Finally, we will turn to Hume’s resolution of the puzzling “paradox” about 
the vacuum and the plenum which we mentioned earlier in this paper.
4.1. The Evacuated Chamber
Hume considers three objections to his claim that we have no idea of a vacuum. 
The second objection concerns a classic conundrum about a chamber from which 
all of the enclosed matter has been annihilated by, as Hume puts it, “the omnipo-
tence of the deity” (T 1.2.5.3; SBN 54–55). If it is accepted that the annihilation of 
all of the matter inside any enclosed chamber is both possible and conceivable, 
and that this can happen without any changes in the positions or motions of the 
walls of the chamber, the question arises as to how we conceive the situation that 
ensues once the chamber has been evacuated.
This question was particularly acute in Hume’s time because, with the rise of 
the new pneumatics,24 it was held to be the case in many quarters that ordinary, 
non-omnipotent and non-deified human beings had actually achieved the evacu-
ation of all air from some enclosed spaces, and in some cases this contention was 
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extended to the view that natural philosophers had succeed in evacuating all 
matter altogether from these enclosed spaces. In stating the second objection to 
his account, Hume portrays it as presenting us with a choice between a grossly un-
acceptable Cartesian account of an ineffaceable plenum containing no relational 
voids and a vacuum-affirming Newtonian response:
There are some metaphysicians, who answer, that since matter and exten-
sion are the same, the annihilation of one necessarily implies that of the 
other; and there being now no distance betwixt the walls of the cham-
ber, they touch each other; in the same manner as my hand touches the 
paper, which is immediately before me. But though this answer be very 
common, I defy these metaphysicians to conceive the matter according 
to their hypothesis, or imagine the floor and roof, with all the opposite 
sides of the chamber, to touch each other, while they continue in rest, 
and preserve the same position. For how can the two walls, that run from 
south to north, touch each other, while they touch the opposite ends of 
two walls, that run from east to west? And how can the floor and roof ever 
meet, while they are separated by the four walls, that lie in a contrary posi-
tion? If you change their position, you suppose a motion. If you conceive 
any thing betwixt them, you suppose a new creation. But keeping strictly 
to the two ideas of rest and annihilation, it is evident, that the idea, which 
results from them, is not that of a contact of parts, but something else; 
which is concluded to be the idea of a vacuum. (T 1.2.5.3; SBN 55–56)
Briefly stated, the objection is that the idea one forms of a chamber from which 
all matter has been evacuated must be either the idea of a chamber in which the 
opposite and formerly separated walls are now in contact, despite the fact that they 
underwent no motion as a result of the evacuation, or the idea of a chamber that 
encloses empty space. So, if one grants that it is evident that the resulting idea is 
not an idea of contact between the opposite walls, one is then committed to the 
conclusion that the idea is an idea of empty space; that is, it is an idea of extension 
without matter, or a vacuum.
Hume’s response to this objection diagnoses the dilemma it poses as a false 
one, and relies on his perceptual relationist account of spatial perception, and 
the accompanying distinction between distance and extension, which allows us 
to conceive the evacuated chamber as neither a situation in which the absence of 
intervening matter entails that there is no remaining distance between the opposed 
walls of the chamber, nor as one in which the perseverance of those distance rela-
tions in the absence of matter means that the chamber now surrounds a region of 
empty Newtonian space, or “extension without matter.” He also points out that 
the perception of a chamber from which all enclosed matter has been eliminated 
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is not qualitatively different from the perception of a chamber that does contain 
matter, but in which that matter is invisible to us:
We may make almost the same answer to the second objection, deriv’d 
from the conjunction of the ideas of rest and annihilation. When every 
thing is annihilated in the chamber, and the walls continue immoveable, 
the chamber must be conceiv’d much in the same manner as at present, 
when the air that fills it, is not an object of the senses. This annihilation 
leaves to the eye, that fictitious distance, which is discover’d by the differ-
ent parts of the organ, that are affected, and by the degrees of light and 
shade; and to the feeling, that which consists in a sensation of motion 
in the hand, or other member of the body. In vain shou’d we search any 
farther. On whichever side we turn this subject, we shall find that these 
are the only impressions such an object can produce after the suppos’d 
annihilation; and it has already been remark’d, that impressions can give 
rise to no ideas, but to such as resemble them. (T 1.2.5.23; SBN 63–64)
Hume’s relationist account of spatial perception allows him to say that we 
can perceive the walls of the chamber to be disposed in the same manner they 
were disposed originally, standing in distance relations that do not require for 
their support any intervening extension falling between the distant objects. 
That is, we can conceive of the bounding structures of the chamber as forming a 
relational void, a three-dimensional analog to the two-dimensional annular disk 
we discussed in section two.
At this point, we would do well to develop more carefully Hume’s distinc-
tion between invisible and intangible distance, on the one hand, and visible and 
tangible distance on the other. But since, as before, we will be focusing entirely 
on visual perceptions and not tactile perceptions, we can drop the references to 
what is tangible or intangible, and attend only to the distinction between visible 
distances and invisible distances.
To help sharpen our understanding of the distinction, let us amplify Hume’s 
consideration of the luminous bodies thought experiment by considering three 
distinct types of situation in which we might be presented with two luminous 
bodies whose light presents only those bodies themselves, without giving us any 
impression of surrounding objects:
1. We are presented with two luminous bodies A and B, which are at some 
distance separated from each other, and where there is nothing extended 
whatsoever lying between them.
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2. We are presented with two luminous bodies A and B, which are at some 
distance separated from each other, and between which there lies some 
extended stretch of matter which is also illuminated.
3. We are presented with two luminous bodies A and B, which are at some 
distance separated from each other, and between which there lies some 
extended stretch of matter which is not illuminated either by the emission 
of its own light, or by reflected light thrown on it by A and B.
To consider these three cases in the right way, imagine that in each case the descrip-
tion describes the entire contents of the visual scene with which we are presented 
at the time in which that presentation occurs.
The first situation constitutes what we have called a relational void. It consists 
entirely of two objects standing in some distance relation, with nothing extended 
whatsoever lying between them, neither matter of any kind or empty space. The 
other two situations constitute cases in which the two bodies A and B bound a 
genuine extension. However, the extension in the third situation is invisible, since 
it emits no light of its own, and is not illuminated by light from the nearby bodies 
A and B. The extension in the second situation, on the other hand, is visible to us.
Clearly, in the first and third situations the visual scene will appear to the 
viewer in exactly the same way: they will be qualitatively indistinguishable. And 
I think it is important to make note of this fact in understanding what Hume is 
talking about when he refers to the distinction between visible distances and 
invisible distances. Whether the distance between two objects A and B is visible 
or not is a clearly a relational property that distance bears to some third external 
thing, namely, a viewer. On the other hand, there is a different distinction we can 
draw that has to do with the foundation of the distance itself. Some distances, like 
those described in both the second and third cases presented above are, we can 
say, mixed with extension: there is some extended stuff lying between the bodies, 
and which serves to separate them. Other distances, such as the distance described 
in the first case, are relational voids: the bodies are separated, but there is nothing 
whatsoever lying between them, and that serves to separate them.
We should not confuse the distinction between visible and invisible distance 
with the distinction between distances that are mixed with extension and those 
which are not mixed with extension, and are instead relational voids. The distance 
described in the first situation is both invisible and a relational void; and the 
distance described in the second situation is both visible and mixed with exten-
sion. But the distance described in the third situation is both invisible and mixed 
with extension. Clearly, Hume recognizes the difference between a distance that 
is mixed with extension, but happens to be invisible, and one that is invisible 
because it is not mixed with extension at all. Hume invokes this distinction in 
the passage I quoted earlier that presents his response to the evacuated chamber. 
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Imagine the chamber in question to be made of transparent glass. If we were to 
view the chamber both before and after all matter within it has been evacuated, 
it would look no different after the evacuation than a chamber that still contains 
some matter, say dry air, that happens to be entirely invisible to us.
4.2. Is a Vacuum Impossible?
The first part of Hume’s system concerning space and time, the denial of infinite 
divisibility, is not restricted to the denial of infinitely divisible ideas of extension. Nor 
is it simply the denial of ideas of infinitely divisible extension. Hume goes further 
and draws a conclusion about space or extension itself. Hume argues that no finite 
extension is or could be infinitely divisible (T 1.2.2.2; SBN 30–31). Instead, every 
finite extension is ultimately composed of a finite number of indivisible parts (T 
1.2.4.1; SBN 40). We should ask, then, whether Hume means to draw a similarly 
strong conclusion from his discussion of the vacuum. Given that we have no ideas 
of extension without matter, does it follow, by Hume’s lights, that there can be no 
extension without matter? And does Hume move from his perceptual relationism 
about our ideas of extension and the spatial disposition of matter to a relationist 
view of extension itself and the spatial disposition of matter?
Donald Baxter answers “yes” to the first question. While noting that Hume 
does not explicitly say that a spatial vacuum is impossible, Baxter concludes: 
“There is no need to. He has already said that space consists of indivisible parts 
that would be non-existent unless they were colored or tangible. The ‘absurdity’ 
of alternative views demonstrates the ‘truth and reality’ of his own.”25 But I do 
not believe that Hume commits to quite the same type of strong conclusion in the 
case of the vacuum that he gives us in the case of infinite divisibility. Hume does 
clearly affirm that nothing ever appears to us as an extension without matter. Nor 
does there appear to be any way in which this idea could be derived in some less 
immediate way from other impressions and ideas. That is part of what the luminous 
bodies thought experiment is supposed to establish. We have no ideas of extension 
without matter. And since we have no ideas of extension without matter, exten-
sion without matter is inconceivable for us. We cannot conceive of a vacuum.
But Hume sometimes makes reference to supposing something to be the case 
that is nevertheless inconceivable. When we do this, we can speak of matters in 
a way such that we do not quite understand what we are saying. One such sup-
position, Hume says, is the supposition of infinitely divisible extension. Not only 
do we have no idea of an infinitely divisible extension, but the supposition of an 
infinitely divisible extension is “utterly impossible and contradictory” (T 1.2.4.1; 
SBN 39). And therefore, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible.26
This line of thinking might lead us to suspect that, for Hume, just as the sup-
position of an infinitely divisible extension is ultimately absurd and contradictory, 
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the supposition of a vacuum is equally absurd and contradictory, and thus exten-
sion without matter simply cannot exist. But I do not believe that Hume ever makes 
such a definitive statement about the impossibility of a vacuum, or even commits 
to such a statement implicitly. Rather, he sounds a more cautionary note. After 
considering the objection that his reasoning explains “only the manner in which 
objects affect the senses, without endeavoring to account for their real nature and 
operations,” Hume points out that he has made no attempt “to explain the cause, 
which separates bodies after this manner, and gives them a capacity of receiving 
others betwixt them, without any impulse or penetration.” He then continues to 
answer the objection:
I answer this objection, by pleading guilty, and by confessing that my 
intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the 
secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my 
present purpose, I am afraid, that such an enterprise is beyond the reach 
of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body 
otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves 
to the senses. (T 1.2.5.25–26; SBN 64–65)
So, given the opportunity here to pronounce a negative judgment upon the pos-
sibility of a vacuum, Hume demurs. He appears here to adopt an agnostic attitude 
about the ultimate cause of the separation of distant bodies, and does not appear 
to be willing to assert outright the impossibility and contradictoriness of extension 
without matter. That contrasts with his position on infinite divisibility. In his dis-
cussion of that latter topic, Hume did not simply say that he was not attempting to 
penetrate into the ultimate nature of the composition and divisibility of extended 
things, but was also quite definite in asserting that whatever else might be true of 
the composition of extended things, we can know that these things cannot have 
infinitely many parts and cannot be infinitely divisible.
But even though Hume does not decisively assert the unreality of extension 
without matter, he is clear in asserting that extension without matter is inconceiv-
able, and so that insofar as we restrict ourselves to making suppositions about the 
world that lie within the scope of what we can conceive, and entertain hypotheses 
about the unobserved parts of the world that conform with the world as it appears 
to us, we ought not suppose the existence of extension without matter. Rather, 
every conceivable possibility, to the extent it represents extension, represents that 
extension as filled with matter, color or body.
So, either a vacuum is impossible outright or inconceivable at best. But how 
are we to characterize, then, distances that appear to us as invisible and intangible; 
and that upon all investigations of such kind as we are presently capable do not 
yield any detectable material contents? There are two conceivable possibilities: 
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the extended world might contain genuine relational voids—parts of extension 
separated in a purely relational manner by distance, with nothing extended at all 
lying between them—or the world might be an actual material plenum containing 
no relational voids, in which the distances between gross bodies are filled with 
matter that we cannot see or detect, or at least cannot yet detect—some aetherial 
matter perhaps—and which in some way is the hidden cause of the separation 
between bodies. Hume recognizes the possibility, though not the necessity, of 
the apparently empty spaces between objects being filled by matter that happens 
to be invisible.27
4.3. The “Easily Explained” Paradox
Hume concludes Treatise 1.2.5 with the statement of what he calls a “paradox”:
I shall conclude this subject of extension with a paradox, which will easily 
be explained from the foregoing reasoning. This paradox is, that if you are 
pleased to give to the invisible and intangible distance, or in other words, 
to the capacity of becoming a visible and tangible distance, the name of 
a vacuum, extension and matter are the same, and yet there is a vacuum. 
If you will not give it that name, motion is possible in a plenum, without 
any impulse in infinitum, without returning in a circle, and without pen-
etration. But however we may express ourselves, we must always confess, 
that we have no idea of any real extension without filling it with sensible 
objects, and conceiving its parts as visible or tangible. (T 1.2.5.27; SBN 64)
Despite the fact that Hume says this paradox is “easily explained,” this passage 
has been found confusing by some very prominent interpreters,28 and with good 
reason. It is hard even to determine what the paradox is, much less how Hume 
means to explain it. But I believe that the interpretation outlined in this paper 
provides the tools for a very plausible interpretation of the paradox.
I believe Hume sees his perceptual relationist account of our spatial ideas as 
providing the basis for a clever third way between the Cartesian and Newtonian 
doctrines on matter and extension, and as thereby making good on his professed 
hope to develop from his science of human nature a foundation “almost entirely 
new” for the sciences of mathematics and natural philosophy. He is holding up his 
relationist approach as a challenge to those who would affirm that the Cartesian 
and Newtonian pictures exhaust the viable options. For people in the grip of this 
false dilemma, Hume surmises, Hume’s own approach could be seen as paradoxi-
cal. We might imagine this type of thinker—the “traditionalists” one might call 
them—arguing as follows:
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Either the world is a plenum or a vacuum exists. That is because either 
matter is identical to extension (Descartes) or it is not and it moves in 
absolute space (Newton). If matter and space are identical, then there is 
no empty space and the world is a plenum. In that case, the only kinds 
of motion that can occur are vortical motion in a circle, linear impulse in 
infinitum and penetration. If matter and space are not identical, however, 
and some other variety of motion can occur, then the world must contain 
empty spaces, and so a vacuum exists.
Hume has argued, however, that the world might be neither a plenum containing 
no relational voids—a plenum in the intuitive, traditional sense of a materially 
“full” world, and the kind of plenum to which Descartes was apparently commit-
ted—nor a system containing empty, unoccupied space, that is, extension without 
matter, which is the kind of world to which Newton was committed. Rather, the 
word might contain relational voids. But this plenum with relational voids might 
consist of very sparsely disposed material bodies, often standing at distances from 
one another with no other bodies lying between them.
In the statement of the paradox, Hume is implicitly considering the possibility 
that a critic might say that he has defined “vacuum” too strictly, and that the term 
should be taken as referring to any non-material gap between bodies, whether the 
gap is merely a relational void or a genuine, substantive expanse of empty exten-
sion such as some region of Newtonian absolute space. But Hume then goes on in 
the cited passage to make the point that no matter which definition of “vacuum” 
one adopts, one is forced to accept possibilities that the traditionalists would find 
paradoxical. The paradox is easily resolved, however, once one sees that the per-
ceptual relationist account developed by Hume opens up a new conceptual space 
in the crabbed false alternative of the traditionalists. A reconstruction of Hume’s 
resolution of paradox, then, might run like this:
Suppose we just use “vacuum” to refer to any non-matter-filled distance hold-
ing between bodies, something that may just be a relational void: two separated 
bodies for which there is nothing material and nothing extended whatsoever 
lying between them, but which are capable of receiving bodies between them 
without otherwise undergoing any change in color, or in manner of arrange-
ment or disposition. In this case, we still do not have any extension without 
matter. But we have a vacuum. (“Incoherent!” says the traditionalist.)
But suppose instead we use “vacuum” in our original, strict sense to refer to 
extension without matter. Then a vacuum is inconceivable. So, should we then 
say that the only thing conceivable is a plenum? Well, yes, if by “plenum” 
we mean only a plenum possibly containing relational voids. But in that kind of 
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plenum, it is still possible to have motion without having penetration, circu-
lar motion or impulse in infinitum. (“Paradoxical!” rails the traditionalist.)
But in responding to each half of the dilemma, our perplexed traditionalist has 
erred in failing to recognize the conceptual coherence of a third alternative: a 
situation in which there is no empty space, but where there are relational voids. 
In such a case, a body that is part of some system of bodies can move in such a way 
that it ends up differently located with respect to all of the other bodies, even if 
those others bodies have not moved with respect to one another.
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1 References to the Treatise are to Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Norton and 
Norton, hereafter cited in the text as “T” followed by Book, part, section, and paragraph 
number, and to Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. by Nidditch, 
cited in the text as “SBN” followed by the page number.
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“Hume’s Doctrine”; Flew, “Infinite Divisibility”; and Fogelin, “Hume and Berkeley.”
3 See, for a statement of his intention, T Intro 4 (SBN xv).
4 My views on Hume’s understanding of our ideas of space and time have also been 
heavily influenced by the work of Donald Baxter, especially “Hume’s Theory of Space 
and Time.” See also Baxter’s Hume’s Difficulty. Baxter also adopts a relationist reading 
of Hume to make sense of the latter’s discussion of the vacuum. However, a key part 
of Baxter’s reading of Hume is that “we can only conceive of space and time by means 
of abstract, that is, general ideas” (“Hume’s Theory,” 136), and Baxter believes this 
restriction is part of the explanation for why we cannot conceive of a vacuum. My 
alternative reading, as I have indicated, is that Hume intends to give an account of all 
of our particular ideas of space and time, and that his denial of ideas of a vacuum has 
nothing essentially to do with his account of abstract or general ideas.
5 See, especially, Falkenstein, “Hume on Manners of Disposition” and “Space and 
Time.”
6 I use the phrase “objects or components” here because I take it to be Hume’s view that 
manners of disposition or manners of arrangement pertain both to the components of 
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perceptions themselves, and to the objects external to impressions that they represent, 
and in whose existence we are compelled to believe.
7 This presupposition appears in Hume’s brief discussion of the workings of mi-
croscopes and telescopes at T 1.2.1.4 (SBN 27–28). Despite these representationalist 
presuppositions, Hume presents no detailed or systematic account of the nature of 
the physical and physiological origin of our perceptions. I believe this omission is in-
tentional, and that Hume intends his science of the understanding to be autonomous 
with respect to natural philosophy and physiology, and to depend as little as possible 
on conjectures about the origins of impressions.
8 Hume argues for the inconceivability of external objects as specifically different from 
impressions at both T 1.2.6.8–9 (SBN 67–68) and T 1.4.5.19 (SBN 241). More precisely, 
he says in the former passage that it is “impossible for us so much as to conceive or form 
an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.” He then goes on 
in the next paragraph, however, to say, “The farthest we can go towards a conception of 
external objects, when suppos’d specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a 
relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects.” In order 
to avoid attributing an outright contradiction to Hume, I believe we must interpret 
Hume strictly here: he is saying that, in forming a relative idea of an object supposed 
to be specifically different from a perception, we are not conceiving that object, but 
advancing toward a conception of it.
9 For background on the medieval and early modern philosophical discussion of the 
vacuum, including the Leibniz—Clarke correspondence, see Grant, Much Ado About 
Nothing. An excellent overview of the debate between the Newtonians and Cartesians 
on the nature of space can be found in Rynasiewicz, “Newton’s Views on Space, Time, 
and Motion.” Further discussion of what was at stake in this debate may be found in 
Huggett, “What Did Newton Mean by ‘Absolute Motion’.”
10 It is extremely challenging to define this form of “continuity” in Hume’s finitis-
tic setting, and it is clearly not equivalent to the standard, contemporary account of 
continuity used in analysis and point-set topology. But we will assume that for any 
two minima A and B in an extension, there is always on Hume’s view a finite sequen-
tial path of minima from A to B such that any two successive minima in the path are 
contiguous. For background on the challenges of developing a finitistic geometry, see 
Van Bendegem, “Finitism in Geometry.”
11 As one example of a passage that shows Hume clearly committed to the claim that 
the indivisible minima are parts of extension, see T 1.2.3.12 (SBN 39).
12 See especially T 1.2.3.13 through T 1.2.3.16 (SBN 39–40).
13 Some important recent discussions of the issues are Friedman, Foundations of Space-
Time Theories; Nerlich, The Shape of Space; Sklar, Space, Time and Spacetime.
14 The conceptual separation of our intuitive conception of distance and our intuitive 
conception of length can be brought out in a modern mathematical setting by care-
fully distinguishing the metric defined on some space from any measures that might be 
defined on that same space. A metric on a set S is a two-place function d defined on the 
ordered pairs in S X S, assigning to each such pair some real number, and such that all 
of the following constraints hold:
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For all x and y, d(x,y) ≥ 0
For all x and y, d(x,y) = 0 iff x = y
For all x and y, d(x,y) = d(y,x)
For all x, y and z, d(x,z) ≤ d(x,y) + d(y,z).
There is no requirement that the underlying set S have any defined topological structure; 
nor must it be the case that S is even infinite. A measure on S, by contrast, is not defined 
on ordered pairs in S, but on some appropriate family of subsets of S, and is intended 
to capture various intuitive conceptions of size, for example, length, area, volume or 
angle measure. Formal definitions of a measure incorporate additivity assumptions that 
embody the intuitive idea that the size of a set should always be greater than or equal 
to the size of the subsets it contains, and that the size of a set should in some sense be 
equal to the sum of the sizes any disjoint parts into which it can be fully decomposed. 
The standard Euclidean metric and line measures defined on Rn have the property that 
distance d between two points x and y is always equal to the measure of least-measured 
(shortest) curve having x and y as endpoints. However, other possible relationships 
between metric and measure are possible. For example, in Minkowski spacetime, the 
four-dimensional Lorentz space L4, there is always a maximally long timelike curve be-
tween any two timelike separated points, and the temporal “distance” those two points 
is always equal to the “length” of that maximally long curve. For standard definitions 
of metric and measure, see Weisstein, “Metric” and Cortzen and Weisstein, “Measure.”
15 For a very clear modern presentation of the rudiments of elementary classical 
mechanics along these lines, see Taylor, Classical Mechanics.
16 Notice that the doctrine of the independence of matter and the doctrine of the 
independence of distance are logically independent. Either view could, in principle, 
be maintained consistently with the denial of the other.
17 This last claim needs to be hedged a bit. Hume’s finitist account of geometry, 
distance and magnitude permits the possibility that a region of extended body that 
appears quite solid and continuous to us is nevertheless constituted of only finitely 
many minimum components, and so for any arbitrary component in one part of the 
annular ring there may not be some component that is, precisely speaking, directly 
across from it. Even the concept of directly across is one that, on Hume’s account, can 
only be made sense of and applied by using an inherently imprecise and inexact visual 
measure.
18 Noted previously in section 1. See T 1.2.3.4 (SBN 34).
19 We might in the case of ordinary life experience a relative absence, severe dimin-
ishment or privation of light, but would presumably experience a total absence of light 
only in very unusual, experimentally arranged circumstances.
20 See Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.8.2–7.
21 To resist this interpretation, one might propose that Hume holds black not to 
be a color, but the mere absence of color. But there are several pieces of direct textual 
evidence showing that Hume does indeed regard black as a color, and that blackness is 
thus something other than darkness: “But observing afterwards a globe of black marble 
and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate 
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resemblances, in what formerly seemed, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a 
little more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by 
a distinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they 
are in effect the same and undistinguishable” (T 1.1.7.18; SBN 26). Next, “but still keep 
in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of 
whatever colour or substance” (T 1.1.7.18; SBN 26). And finally, “But afterwards having 
experience of the other colours of violet, green, red, white, black, and of all the different 
compositions of these, and finding a resemblance in the disposition of coloured points, 
of which they are composed, we omit the peculiarities of colour” (T 1.2.3.5; SBN 35).
22 The reading I have offered differs from that given by Dale Jacquette in his “Hume 
on Infinite Divisibility and the Negative Idea of the Vacuum.” Jacquette takes Hume 
to argue that in our mixed impressions of luminous objects in empty space, “the ambi-
ent sensation sources make it possible for the perceiver also to experience the colored 
background of the objects in space, as much as when the darkened visual background 
is pitch black as when it appears in the blue sky between the perceiver’s outstretched 
fingers in Hume’s instructive comparison” (Jacquette, 429). I have argued, however, 
that the outstretched fingers example is used by Hume to motivate a contrast with the 
contrary situation Hume is asking us to imagine—the luminous bodies thought experi-
ment—in which there is no ambient light and nothing illuminated by the luminous 
bodies but the bodies themselves.
23 Miren Boehm has argued in a recent paper (“Filling the Gaps in Hume’s Vacuums”) 
that one cannot separate the concepts of extension and distance in Hume, and so if, as 
Hume says, the invisible and intangible distance is not empty space and thus not an 
extension, then we must conclude that, for Hume, that invisible and intangible distance 
is not genuinely a distance at all. But if my interpretation of Hume’s illuminated bodies 
thought experiment is correct, it is evident that this interpretation is incorrect. In an-
other recent paper, “Hume on the Idea of a Vacuum,” Lorne Falkenstein has argued that 
Hume’s denial of the conceivability of a vacuum fails, because “Hume would have had 
the resources to explain how we can have an idea of space without content, had he cared 
to use them” (140). Falkenstein’s subsequent discussion of this question, however, does 
not distinguish clearly between perceiving or conceiving a relational void, on the one 
hand, and perceiving or conceiving a vacuum, on the other hand. He argues: “Hume’s 
subsequent appeal to the experience of darkness had by the blind is also inadequate. We 
can grant that just as the experience of darkness had by the blind gives them no idea of 
space or distance or extension, so it gives us no idea of space or distance or extension. 
But from this it does not follow that we cannot perceive an empty space between two 
stars in the otherwise total blackness of the night sky. We perceive the empty space 
between the two stars by perceiving something the blind cannot perceive: the stars 
on either side of it and the remote, as opposed to proximate, manner of disposition 
of those stars. The idea of empty space is a compound idea arising from the idea of 
visible or tangible objects disposed at some distance from one another” (Falkenstein, 
161). The problem is that perceiving a remote manner of disposition between two stars 
is not the same thing as perceiving an empty space between the two stars. The first is 
simply the perception of a spatial relation holding between the two stars. The latter, if it 
were possible, would involve the perception of something extended between the stars, 
something that happens to be empty. For Hume, space is extension, and extension can 
never be perceived or conceived as unoccupied. So, we never perceive or conceive empty 
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space. However, that does not prevent us from perceiving or conceiving two bodies to 
be remotely distant from one another with nothing lying between them.
24 For an account of these developments, see Webster, “The Discovery of Boyle’s Law.”
25 Baxter, “Hume’s Theory,” 137.
26 A supposition is not absurd, for Hume, because it involves a single idea that is itself 
inconsistent; but rather, it involves multiple ideas that are mutually contradictory in 
some way. Every particular idea we have, Hume claims, represents something that is 
possible.
27 Hume claims that the decision between these two possibilities—a world contain-
ing relational voids but no vacuums, and a world that is a plenum in the more robust 
sense that does not even contain relational voids—cannot be settled by any decisive 
arguments that he can find. But Hume then appears to opt for relational voids on the 
strictly practical grounds of conformity to common opinion: “Thus if it be asked, 
whether or not the invisible and intangible distance be always full of body, or of 
something that by an improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible, I 
must acknowledge, that I find no very decisive arguments on either side; though I am 
inclined to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar and popular notions. 
If THE NEWTONIAN philosophy be rightly understood, it will be found to mean no 
more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be placed after such a manner, 
is to receive bodies betwixt them, without impulsion or penetration. The real nature 
of this position of bodies is unknown. We are only acquainted with its effects on the 
senses, and its power of receiving body. Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, 
than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in 
subjects, that exceed all human capacity” (T Appendix; SBN 639). So, it is Hume’s view 
that any apparent references to extension without matter, a vacuum, in the Newto-
nian philosophy can be reinterpreted so as to entail no more than the presence of the 
invisible and intangible distances that Hume has described. These distances might 
be invisible because they are relational voids. But they might also be invisible simply 
because they contain a kind of matter that happens to be invisible to us, but could be 
made visible by “an improvement of our senses.” Hume is not dogmatically committed 
to either alternative. Rather, he says, he only “inclines” to the former view as the one 
more consonant with vulgar and popular notions.
28 See, for example, Kemp Smith’s discussion of the paradox in The Philosophy of David 
Hume, 316, and Frasca-Spada’s discussion of Kemp Smith’s attempted interpretation in 
Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self in Hume’s Treatise, 158–59.
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